Warning Letter to Alliance Pipeline Ltd., and Tamarack Valley Energy Ltd., and Subsurface Construction Corporation

Between March and November 2022, Tamarack and Alliance entered into five agreements and/or written consents. These included a pipeline crossing agreement and four consents for ground disturbance within the prescribed area (outside the RoW). Alliance had weekly meetings with Tamarack and Tamarack’s Engineering, Procurement and Construction Management service provider during the project. Alliance and Tamarack representatives completed a site walk in August 2022. The agreements and responses provided by Alliance demonstrate this was a complex ongoing project over an extended time frame.

A One-Call request was received by Alliance in November of 2022, and the pipeline was located and marked. Following a request by Tamarack to locate the pipeline again on 31 January 2023, an Alliance representative went to site to ensure the pipeline was properly marked. The Alliance representative had no direct contact with Tamarack or Subsurface. Later in February, an Alliance representative spoke with a Tamarack representative via phone, confirmed that an agreement was in place and that the line was still marked. The Alliance representative determined that no work was to be taking place in the RoW and that no additional measures were needed. In follow-up, Alliance confirmed an awareness that work was planned within the prescribed area.

Alliance field personnel were not present on-site during ground disturbance activities within the prescribed area (contrary to Alliance’s own requirements) and made no field observations. In the follow-up to this near-miss, Alliance did not demonstrate that field inspections occurred or that field observations were made, in relation to the work covered by the November 2022 consent to ground disturbance agreement, and provided no records of either.

Alliance, having granted permission for ground disturbance activities within the prescribed area, solely relied on Tamarack as the party that had care and control at the worksite to communicate the essential operational details and associated risks and controls to Subsurface. Alliance had not communicated or interacted with Subsurface prior to the near-miss. There was also no evidence to suggest that Alliance attempted to proactively identify other third parties that may be involved in the construction activities near its pipeline (such as subcontractors) even though this was a long-standing project that was known to Alliance and included multiple construction phases spread over time, including, ultimately, work within the ROW and in the immediate vicinity of the pipeline. In this case, Alliance ought to have known and did know about many aspects of the project and it was reasonable to expect that Alliance could do more and act proactively to ensure the safe execution of the work near its pipeline.

Further, Alliance relied on several controls including: planning meetings, the One-Call process, written agreements, advance notice by third parties planning ground disturbance, “DO NOT DIG” pipeline markers, temporary stakes marking the centerline of the pipeline and verbal communications. These controls can be effective for coordinating actions among multiple stakeholders and adhering to safety protocols, but they offer a limited ability to control hazards in the workplace.

However, for complex projects with significant work adjacent to and within the RoW, such as this one, reliance on the above controls alone may not suffice. Additional controls, that might include physical barriers to isolate workers from hazards, can offer another layer of protection. Such controls can assist in controlling human factors and could reduce the risk of unauthorized activities by physically preventing access to hazardous areas.

The OPR management system provisions require management systems that are comprehensive and proactive, as well as the development and implementation of controls to prevent, manage and mitigate potential hazards and risks and the communication of these controls to all affected parties.^{Footnote 4} It is crucial for CER-regulated companies, like Alliance, to evaluate the effectiveness of their control measures, especially for longer term or more complex projects where the potential for unauthorized access, deviations from the work scope, and associated risks are higher.

Tamarack did not make Subsurface aware of the requirements when working in proximity to the Alliance pipeline. This includes restrictions on vehicles and mobile equipment on the RoW as well as ground disturbance in the prescribed area. Tamarack did not communicate the requirements for engaging in ground disturbance, or inform its contractor of the DPR-A.

Tamarack issued safe work permits to Subsurface each day, however, the information contained in those permits was not sufficient to demonstrate compliance with section 4 of the DPR-A. For example, the permits did not have any information about the DPR-A to demonstrate that the information was provided to, and understood by, the Subsurface crew. The safe work permits also did not specify the presence of a CER-regulated pipeline in the vicinity of the worksite and Tamarack’s Ground Disturbance Code of Practice did not include any instructions on how to carry out the duty to inform.

Subsurface was engaged by Tamarack to install piles. Subsurface, using a Junttan piling machine, drove several piles within 3 meters of the Alliance pipeline, the closest being 22 inches from the pipeline. This ground disturbance within the Alliance pipeline RoW occurred without written consent from Alliance as required by DPR-A paragraph 10(1)(a) and did not follow the requirements of subparagraph 10(3)(c)(i).

Subsurface verified that a locate request had been made by Tamarack. However, the verification step did not ensure that the locate request was valid, that it applied to the specific scope of work to be performed (pile driving) nor that all responses from utility owners in the area were received. As a result, a locate request required by DPR-A paragraph 10(1)(b) was not made prior to working on the RoW and 30-metre prescribed area.

While the Alliance pipeline was previously marked and the markings were visible to the equipment operators installing the piles, Subsurface did not obtain the written safety measures or an explanation of the markings required by DPR-A paragraph 10(1)(c). This information is provided in writing by the pipeline company following a locate request (usually in the form of a pipeline locate report or stakeout report) and should be expected as part of the ground disturbance records prior to performing work. In addition to ground disturbance work, Subsurface operated mobile equipment (pile driver) across the RoW without written consent from the pipeline company as required by DPR-A section 12.